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Free and Fair Elections, Violence and Conflict 
 
 
Muna Ndulo* and Sara Lulo** 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Elections are a defining characteristic of democracy, and thus form an integral 
part of the democratization process.  Over the past decade, electoral systems and 
processes have become a centerpiece of UN peacekeeping missions and post-conflict 
democratization projects undertaken by intergovernmental organizations and donor 
agencies such as World Bank and USAID. The emphasis on elections as an element 
of UN peacekeeping missions is linked to a shift in focus to state rebuilding (or state 
creation, as was the case in East Timor).1  Elections thus provide a means for “jump-
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1 Benjamin Reilly, Elections in Post-Conflict Societies, in THE UN ROLE IN PROMOTING 
DEMOCRACY: BETWEEN IDEALS AND REALITY 113, 113 (Edward Newman & Roland Rich, 
eds.) (2004) [hereinafter Reilly, Elections in Post-Conflict Societies]. 
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starting a new, post-conflict political order; for stimulating the development of 
democratic politics; for choosing representatives; for forming governments; and for 
conferring legitimacy upon the new political order.”2   
Recent election-related violence in countries such as Iraq, Afghanistan, Kenya, 
and Zimbabwe have led some to question whether elections reduce the risk of 
conflict and in fact lead to stability, democracy, peace and development. For example, 
Havard Hegre and Hanne Fjelde have recently argued that there is no evidence that 
post-war elections reduce conflict in the short term, but rather that electoral processes 
are associated with heightened risk of civil war.3  Such violence is often attributed to a 
lack of “security” before elections take place.  There is thus an arguably growing view 
that security should be the dispositive pre-requisite for the organization of post-
conflict elections.4 
Although it is true that post-conflict elections have resulted in violence in some 
countries, it is important to keep in mind that this scenario is not the whole story or 
indeed the only story.  The experiences of Namibia (1989), Cambodia (1993) South 
Africa (1994), Mozambique (1994), El Salvador (1994), East Timor (2001, 2002) and, 
in many respects, Sierra Leone (2002), and Liberia (2005) are notable examples of 
successful elections held in so-called “fragile” countries. 
This Article examines whether elections are a precondition to democratization 
and durable peace.  We argue that, although elections alone cannot be equated with 
democracy, elections indeed are an intrinsic component of the dispensation of 
democracy.  Further, while security is one factor that is relevant to planning elections 
in post-conflict countries, “security” must be considered in the context of a broader 
set of challenges and conditions in designing an electoral process capable of achieving 
a peaceful transfer of power reflecting the will of the citizenry.      
We first consider the central role of elections in the democratization process, and 
the corresponding nature of election violence.  We then identify some of the key 
challenges to holding elections in post-conflict countries, before turning to the 
conditions critical to a successful election.  Particular attention is given to the 
international community’s role in ensuring free and fair post-conflict elections.  The 
Article concludes by arguing that however “successful” the process, elections must 
not be considered a “one-off” initiative or an end in themselves.  Sustained attention 
is needed to advance not only the establishment of democratic institutions and 
processes to ensure good governance, but also the economic development of the 
post-conflict country.  Thus, while elections undoubtedly require advance planning 
and considerable investment of time and money, the achievement of even peaceful 
                                                 
2 Benjamin Reilly, Post-Conflict Elections: Constraints and Dangers, 9 INT’L PEACEKEEPING, 118 
(2002). 
3 Havard Hegre & Hanne Fjeld, Democratization and Post-Conflict Transitions, in PEACE AND 
CONFLICT 2010, 79 (J. Joseph Hewitt, Jonathan Wilkenfeld & Ted Robert Gurr, eds., 2010) 
[hereinafter PEACE AND CONFLICT 2010].   
4 See, e.g., Wadir Safi, Security and Elections in Afghanistan: Why the Two Must Go Together, NATO 
Review (2009), available at http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2009/Afghanistan-law-order-
elections/security-elections/EN/index.htm. 
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elections will be undermined if the citizenry does not experience an improvement in 
the economic conditions that, more often than not, helped spur the conflict in the 
first place.    
 
 
II.  INTRINSIC ROLE OF ELECTIONS IN POST-CONFLICT DEMOCRATIZATION 
 
Elections represent an important dimension in the efforts towards democratic 
consolidation in any country.5  Stated differently, elections are not synonymous with 
democracy, but are a central component of a functioning democratic system. 
In discussions of election security and violence, it is relevant to consider the 
nature and underlying purpose of election violence.  Elections are a contest for 
power, and are therefore inherently contentious; unless conducted fairly, they can 
(and often do) lead to violence. 
Political parties participating in an election use violence, intimidation and conflict 
to influence the results or timing of an election.6  This is particularly true when a 
particular side perceives the process as unfair or exclusive.  As Jeff Fischer rightly 
observes, when electoral violence occurs under these circumstances, “it is not a product 
of an electoral process; it is the breakdown of an electoral process.”7   
The challenge, therefore, is to ensure that elections are fair, credible and 
transparent.  In the words of Fischer:  
 
[A]n electoral process is an alternative to violence as a means of 
achieving governance. However, when an electoral process is 
perceived as unfair, unresponsive or corrupt, its political 
legitimacy is compromised and stakeholders are motivated 
to go outside the established norms to achieve their political 
objectives.  Electoral conflict and violence become tactics in political 
competition.8 
 
Thus, in the post-conflict context, it is fundamental that the electoral process be 
governed by clear and fair rules so that even the losers of the contest can trust that 
the rules have been applied justly; otherwise, these actors are more likely to continue 
the contest by other (violent) means. 
Experience shows that post-conflict elections can—and do—help countries 
transition into functioning democracies.  In this regard, it is relevant to note the 
                                                 
5 Tawanda Mutasah, Beyond Southern Africa: Electoral Politics and the New Pan-Africanism, in 
MEDIA INSTITUTE OF SOUTHERN AFRICA, OUTSIDE THE BALLOT BOX: PRECONDITIONS FOR 
ELECTIONS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA 2005/2006, 51, 51-52 (Jeanette Minnie, ed., 2006), available 
at http://www.comminit.com/en/node/278921.  
6 See Jeff Fischer, Electoral Conflict and Violence, 12 ELECTIONS TODAY 6, 6 (2004). 
7 Id. (emphases added). 
8 Id. (emphases added). 
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“success” of several post-conflict elections in advancing the consolidation of 
democracy.      
Mozambique’s 1994 UN-supervised elections are credited as having played an 
important role in the country’s transition from violent conflict to democracy.  
Notably, the three elections held in Mozambique since 1994 (i.e., the 1999, 2004 and 
2009 elections) have included the participation of multiple political parties. Although 
one party has retained control of both the presidency and parliament, the opposition 
has meaningfully participated in each of the elections.  Karbo and Mutisi argue that 
“[t]his persistent contestation and challenge to the incumbency has helped to 
consolidate and refine the election process, which has ushered in renewed hopes for 
all African countries engulfed in violence and protracted conflicts.”9    
Another important example of a successful “fragile state” election is the 1989 
UN-supervised elections in Namibia.  Indeed, these elections led to the adoption of a 
new constitution.  For Namibia’s election, the UN developed and applied standards 
that moved beyond a relatively narrow and technical view of “free and fair elections,” 
which had essentially focused on the voting activity on election day itself.10  The new 
consensus of what constitutes “free and fair elections” is broader and more 
comprehensive in nature, aiming to ensure that the elections are conducted in a free 
environment with administratively fair rules. The most important criteria for a free 
and fair election include the following:   
 
(1) the right of all voters to participate in the electoral 
process without hindrance; (2) [freedom to campaign for all 
political parties]; (3) secrecy of the ballot; (4) reasonable 
speed in the counting of ballots; (5) accountability and 
openness of the electoral process to the competing parties 
and (6) an acceptable electoral law.11   
 
Significantly, since its first free election in 1989, Namibia has successfully held 
several subsequent elections.   
The historic South African general election of 1994 must also be mentioned.  
These elections, the first multi-racial elections in the country, marked the end of 
apartheid and the establishment of democratic governance.  Special institutions, such 
                                                 
9 Tony Karbo & Martha Mutisi, Post-Conflict Elections and Democracy: A Comparative Analysis of 
the Mozambique and Angolan Elections, CONFLICT TRENDS 2006/2, 19, 21 (2006).    
10 Through the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the United Nations established that 
“[e]veryone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or through 
freely chosen representatives” and that “[t]he will of the people shall be the basis of the 
authority of government: this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which 
shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free 
voting procedures.”  Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 21, G.A. Res. 
217A(III),U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948).   
11 Muna Ndulo, The United Nations and the Monitoring of National Elections, 23 CORNELL L. 
FORUM 13, 15 (1996) (citing to NAT’L DEMOCRATIC INST. FOR INT’L AFFAIRS, NATION 
BUILDING: U.N. AND NAMIBIA 26 (1990)). 
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as the Transitional Executive Council (TEC), were created to ensure that the 
apartheid regime was termed and did not undermine a peaceful transition to 
democracy.  The TEC, which was established by an act of Parliament in 1993, was 
given powers to effectively level the pre-election playing field for all parties 
participating in the election.  Legal barriers were removed that had constrained the 
right to free assembly, thereby facilitating free and open campaigning.  Through an 
Act of Parliament, the Independent Broadcasting Authority was created to foster 
conditions for the operation of free media—an important component of fair 
elections.  Importantly, an Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) was created to 
supervise and manage the election.  The IEC comprised 16 members, including 
respected South Africans, as well as prominent international figures in the field of 
human rights such as Gay McDougall (at that time, with the Lawyers’ Committee for 
Human Rights).  The success of South Africa’s election process is also owed to a 
concerted dedication to voter education and the training of ample election monitors.12  
These are but a few of the “success stories” of post-conflict elections helping to 
bring about a more democratic environment and lasting peace.     
 
 
III.  CHALLENGES PARTICULAR TO POST-CONFLICT ELECTIONS 
 
As post-conflict elections are part of a broader process of democratic reform, 
clearly “ill-timed, badly designed, or poorly run elections can actually undermine the 
broader process of democratization”13 and the establishment of peace.  For example, 
the legitimacy of the recent Afghani elections was undermined by the fact that as 
many as 1.5 million of the 6 million votes cast were reported to have been 
fraudulent,14 further deepening schisms and leaving the democratization process in 
uncertainty.      
The choice of post-conflict electoral system is crucial, as it can effectively set the 
stage for power-sharing among competing groups (and thereby dissipate election-
related conflict).  Angola’s election of 1992 is illustrative in this regard.  The election 
was considered flawed, and eventually spiralled into violence.  Angola’s “failure” is 
largely attributed to poorly-timed, “fast-tracked” elections that did not take into 
account country-specific conditions, and failed to provide for the possibility of 
power-sharing arrangements.15   
Experience has shown that a proportional voting system is generally favourable 
for post-conflict countries insofar as such a model allows for “power sharing”; even 
those parties with comparatively fewer votes stand to win representation in 
government.  The proportional voting system aims to correlate the percentage of 
                                                 
12 See, e.g., Nadine Gordimer, Rising to the Ballot: The Quiet, Sacred Success of South Africa’s Voter 
Education Crusade, WASH. POST,  Apr. 24, 1994. 
13 Reilly, supra note 1, at 115 . 
14 Richard Lappin, Afghanistan and the Dilemma of Post-Conflict Elections, THE MÉTROPOLITAIN, 
Oct. 1, 2009, available at http://www.themetropolitain.ca/articles/view/695.  
15 See Karbo & Mutisi, supra note 9, at 20. 
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votes cast for groups of candidates with the percentage of legislative seats allocated – 
i.e., “proportional representation.”  In contrast, a “first-past-the-post” or majoritarian 
voting system (such as in the United States) establishes a “winner-take-all” model.  In 
such cases, the losing party is assured no role to play in the new government, placing 
increased pressure (and risk of violence) on the high-stakes election.16  As Angola 
illustrated, where there is no stable democracy and opponents are vying for the “only 
prize worth having,” it is less likely that the loser will accept the elections results -- 
and it is more likely that violent struggle will ensue.17   For this reason, most post-
conflict elections organized by the UN in recent years have used some form of 
proportional representation (e.g., Namibia in 1989, Nicaragua in 1990, Cambodia in 
1993, Mozambique in 1994, Kosovo in 2001, and Sierra Leone in 2002). 
The party list proportional system has become the de facto voting system of 
choice in UN-managed elections, as the party-list system does not require demarcating 
electoral districts (and is therefore considerably simpler to organize from a logistics 
standpoint). It is also easier to gauge which areas are violence prone in order to direct 
individuals to vote in safer areas.  An additional benefit to the party list proportional 
system is that more women and minorities tend to be nominated and elected through 
this system.18   
In any event, it is beyond dispute that elections organized in post-conflict 
environments take place in tense and high-risk environments, and are therefore 
“fundamentally different from those organised under normal circumstances.”19  Set 
against a backdrop of humanitarian and economic crises and the destruction of 
(usually already inadequate) infrastructure, post-conflict elections involve steep 
challenges. We highlight below some additional key challenges to organizing and 
carrying out elections in a country emerging from conflict.    
 
1.  WEAK POLITICAL PARTIES  
 
Benjamin Reilly describes political parties as “the key agents of political 
articulation, aggregation and representation,” making them “the institution which 
impact most directly on the extent to which social cleavages are translated into 
                                                 
16 Cf. Muna Ndulo, The Democratization Process and Structural Adjustment in Africa, 10 IND. J. OF 
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 315, 355-57 (2003).  
17 See COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM AND GOOD GOVERNANCE IN THE 
COMMONWEALTH 62 (John Hatchard, Muna Ndulo & Peter Slinn, eds., 2004) (citing to Ann 
Reid, INR Foreign Affairs Brief, Conflict Resolution in Africa: Lessons from Angola (Bureau of 
Intelligence and Research, U.S. Dep’t of State, 1993).   
18 In the party list system, voters cast ballots for the party list versus individual candidates.  
Therefore, provided the party list contains women and minority candidates whose names are 
sufficiently prioritized on the list, the party list system guards against voter bias against and 
reluctance to vote for individual women and minority candidates.   
19 Karbo & Mutisi, supra note 9, at 20. 
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national politics.”20  Indeed, obstacles and problems in democratic transition originate 
in the weaknesses of the political parties in a post-conflict society.  The parties are 
structurally weak, and they typically lack orientation, focus or ideology.  Often the 
parties are based on individuals or ethnic divides21 rather than a clear program, leaving 
voters with the unappealing choice between the “devil they know” and the possibly-
worse “unknown.”  
In recent years, international election-related efforts have rightly dedicated greater 
attention to supporting the capacity-building of political parties as credible institutions 
to participate in the democratic political system.  The danger of failing to develop 
legitimate political parties is reflected in Angola’s 1992 elections. There the 18-month 
election window following the Bicesse accords “did not offer adequate time for 
building a party machinery that was capable of offering a credible challenge to the 
incumbent [Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA)] government, 
which had the control of the state and its institutions including the electoral 
commission.”22  The experience of El Salvador stands in contrast in this regard, with 
the two current major political parties—the Nationalist Republican Alliance 
(ARENA) and Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN)—transforming 
themselves from their military roots during the country’s civil war to viable political 
parties after the peace agreement in 1992.    
Particularly in cases of weak civil society, “political parties are the key link 
between masses and elites,” with political parties playing “a crucial role in building a 
sustainable democratic polity.”23  In short, a robust democratic system depends largely 
on the institutional strength and capacity of political parties.  Without legitimate 
participants in the post-conflict political sphere, there will be no credible contest.      
 
2.  WEAK GOVERNANCE AND INSTITUTIONS  
 
On a related point, most post-conflict governments suffer from institutional 
weaknesses beyond political party limitations.  This is particularly true in developing 
countries that have lacked the opportunity and resources to establish a legacy of 
democratic institutions and good governance. Too often there is reliance on highly 
personalized and centralized systems of governance in which corruption is rampant 
and civil servants are inadequately trained for their respective offices.  In such 
circumstances, there is a general lack of accountability at all levels of government.   
In terms of political systems, a separation of powers and a system of “checks and 
balances” is not engrained; to the contrary, a confusion of power reigns among the 
                                                 
20 See Benjamin Reilly, Post-War Elections: Uncertain Turning Points of Transition, in FROM WAR 
TO DEMOCRACY: DILEMMAS OF PEACEBUILDING 157, 177 (Anna K. Jarstad & Timothy D. 
Sisk, eds., 2008). 
21 See id. at 178 (“In post-war situations, party politics tend to reflect the social cleavages 
which created the conflict in the first place.  If the conflict had a strong ethnic dimension, for 
instance, then these will tend to be reflected in the new democratic system, particularly if 
‘ethnic parties’ are allowed to form freely.”). 
22 Karbo & Mutisi, supra note 9, at 20. 
23 Reilly, Elections in Post-Conflict Societies, supra note 1, at 114. 
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executive, legislature and judicial branches of government.  There may also be 
outright resistance to democratic elections coming from within the government in 
power.  Such factors make it difficult for elections, let alone longer-term democratic 
processes, to take root and function properly.  Thus, the absence of institutional 
support or effective governance adds a layer of difficulty to post-conflict elections.   
 
3. ABSENCE OF DEMOCRATIC CULTURE AND POLITICAL TOLERANCE 
 
Free and fair elections can be held only where there exists an environment which 
seeks to provide popular participation, promotes human rights and guarantees 
fundamental freedoms, ensures accountability of the government, freedom of the 
judiciary, freedom of the press, and protects and respects political pluralism.  
Typically, none of these conditions exist in a post-conflict country.  As a result, the 
operating environment is one of suspicion and distrust, both at the governmental 
level and among the popular masses, which, particularly in developing countries, can 
be largely uneducated and/or illiterate.  At the governmental level, there is a general 
lack of a sense of state accountability (as well as the lack of individual accountability, 
noted above); more common is political violence, high levels of intimidation and bias.  
In turn, there is widespread suspicion and little or no confidence in the governmental 
system.  Such perceptions also stem from previous election experiences that were 
marred by violence and serious electoral irregularities, as well as the exclusion of 
marginalized groups.  This absence of an underlying democratic culture poses a 
serious problem in conflict countries, and underscores the need for an inclusive 
electoral process, voter education and measures to build confidence in the electoral 
system.  
 
4. DEMOBILIZATION  
 
Demobilization of warring factions should precede a post-conflict election, and 
presents a worthwhile and necessary component of post-conflict efforts to increase 
security and decrease the risk of the resumption or re-escalation of fighting.  For 
example, some credit the peaceful execution of the 1994 Mozambique election at least 
in part to a successful demobilization program.24    
The demobilization process should be treated as providing opportunities for 
institutions of war (such as the army and militias) to begin their transformation into 
legitimate political actors and structures that can support democratization.  
Alternatively, if the institutions of war are not transformed and demobilized, they 
pose a threat to the electoral bodies insofar as they retain the capacity to undermine 
security and intimidate opposing parties and voters.   
Without discounting the importance of demobilization efforts, it is necessary to 
be cognizant of the limits of such efforts.  In the context of long-standing mistrust 
among warring factions, where a measure of power and survival—in the political and 
personal sense—has been predicated on the carrying of arms, it is unrealistic to 
                                                 
24 See Karbo & Mutisi, supra note 9, at 19-20, 23.   
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assume that demobilization will be quickly forthcoming and absolute.  Soldiers may 
be offered incentives such as money, land or job training in exchange for surrendering 
their weapons and thus “demobilizing.”  Experience demonstrates that it is typical for 
previously warring factions to gradually “test” the process and the other side’s good 
faith before making a meaningful commitment to demobilization; commanders will 
be inclined to protect their readiness to fight in the event the demobilization process 
fails.25  For example, it is unlikely (and should not be assumed) that, particularly at the 
early stages of demobilization, the weapons surrendered will be the most critical or 
those of best quality; rather, commanders will direct soldiers to “demobilize” by first 
giving up the least important and oldest weapons in their cadre.  In other words, even 
as the demobilization process is underway, the warring factions remain armed to some 
degree.  Effective demobilization is thus dependent on confidence that there will be a 
fair transfer of power through democratic elections, and that one’s respective “side” 
will have an opportunity to, at minimum, fairly compete for a role in the new 
government. 
Individual cooperation with demobilization is further hampered by severe 
economic constraints and rampant unemployment.  For many if not most militia or 
guerrilla group members involved with internal conflicts, identification with a warring 
faction is the only means for securing an income (whether or not the income 
comprises “legitimate” wages or simply spoils taken by force).  Demobilization efforts 
should therefore include a means of identifying and training soldiers suitable for 
employment in a new representative national army.  This integration process entails 
devising appropriate criteria and assessment methodologies, and training and 
integration itself.  In a broader sense, the link between unemployment and reticence 
to demobilize highlights the need for economic development to create alternative 
forms of employment and reduce the risk of (i.e., perceived need for) violence.   
  
5.  INEFFECTIVE LOCAL FORCE 
 
A somewhat related challenge is the need for a functioning and effective police 
force in a post-conflict country.  The presence and role of local police forces can 
impact not only the general security situation, but also the conduct of the election 
itself.  Among other functions, police are needed to guard ballot boxes, guard election 
materials and maintain order and security at public meetings, campaign events and 
polling stations.   
As Andrew Graham observes,“[t]he electoral process is one that is governed by 
public policy and can only succeed with independent oversight of the process that 
establishe[s] credibility with the population. Police serve a supportive role to that 
                                                 
25 See generally Kimberly Mahling Clark, USAID, DocID: PN-ABY-027, Fostering a Farewell to 
Arms: Preliminary Lessons Learned in the Demobilization and Reintegration of Combatants, 9 (1996) 
(describing various challenges in demobilization efforts, including vigilantism and banditry).    
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independent oversight.”26  However, in most conflict countries, the police and the 
army have proven themselves partial in their approach to policing, and are often used 
by the ruling government as a resource to frustrate free political activity and even 
intimidate voters.27  In short, the domestic police force in a post-conflict country 
typically does not inspire confidence in the people.  Distrust is heightened by an 
institutional culture that tolerates a profound disrespect for human rights.  In such 
cases, local police are an unsuitable presence for guarding the polling stations and 
performing other election-related functions such as transporting ballot papers without 
supervision.    
Because distrusted and/or inadequately trained local police forces can add further 
roadblocks to elections and even interfere with the electoral process, planning should 
include appropriate police training supplemented with UN civilian police as necessary.  
At a practical level, police training should be multi-dimensional, comprising both 
written materials and interactive “face-to-face” training from superiors or front-line 
officers and, at a minimum, cover the nature of the electoral legislation and an 
overview of the electoral process, human rights issues in relation to the police’s role, 
standards of police conduct and communication mechanisms between the police 
forces and the electoral commission.28  Further, the role of the police force must be 
clearly defined—for the benefit of the forces themselves and the public—for each of 
the different phases of the electoral process (pre-election, election day and post-
election). 
 
6. LOGISTICAL CONCERNS 
 
One of the most vexing challenges of organizing post-conflict elections is the 
degree of logistical planning involved, and the lack of basic infrastructure to facilitate 
seemingly simple tasks.  It must be borne in mind that, in a country emerging from 
conflict, infrastructure has typically been ravaged by fighting and destruction, and 
resources are in short supply.  This creates enormous practical and logistical hurdles 
that make elections difficult and cumbersome to organize and carry out.  These 
factors require special consideration and extensive advance planning.    
For example, the condition and security of roadways and the availability of 
adequate transport/vehicles must be assessed for, among other things, the secure 
transportation of ballot boxes—both to polling stations prior to voting, and to the 
electoral commission (or other appropriate location) for counting the ballots after 
votes are cast.  In some cases air transportation might be the only safe way to 
                                                 
26 Andrew Graham, Preparing Police Services in Democratic Regimes to Support the Electoral Process: 
A Survey of Leading Practice 14 (Ukraine Proj., Sch. of Pol’y Stud., Queens Univ., 2006), available 
at http://aceproject.org/ero-en/topics/elections-security/police-forces-in-elections.doc.  
27 Final Report of the United Nations Observer Mission in South Africa (UNOMSA) to the 
United Nations Secretary-General, A Democratic, Non-Racial and United South Africa (May 26, 
1994), 12 [hereinafter 1994 UNOMSA Report]. 
28 Id. at 18, 20-21. See also generally id. (setting forth an overall model of how local police 
should be involved with the electoral process and describing best practices in transitional 
societies, including Macedonia, Nigeria, Azerbaijan and South Africa). 
2010 / Free and Fair Elections, Violence and Conflict 165 
   
 
transport election materials, including ballot boxes, particularly to and from very 
remote areas that are often not reachable by road.   
Road conditions also impact the ease of transport for monitors to travel among 
polling stations on election day and, of crucial importance, voters’ ability to reach 
polling stations.  It likewise bears emphasizing that women voter turnout can be 
disproportionately impacted by mobility and related security concerns.  It is well 
documented that rape and other crimes targeted at women are pervasive during 
conflict and post-conflict times, and even as a tactic to terrorize voters.29  Safety 
concerns should factor into the placement of and distance between polling stations, as 
well as the scheduling of voting hours.  (For example, travel during evening hours, 
particularly when power outages are frequent, can pose additional risks, if not simply 
disincentive, to travel even short distances in order to vote.)         
Beyond infrastructure and transport, logistical planning must take into account 
and adapt to unreliable telecommunication services and the lack of local availability of 
basic office supplies, two key factors that can frustrate day-to-day operations of the 
electoral planning process, let alone the management of election day.  Advance 
planning must also factor in proper warehousing facilities for critical election 
materials.    
The above is a brief and far-from-exhaustive list of practical elements that should 
be considered on a country-specific basis as part of the election planning process.   
The underlying point is that the most basic amenities should not be taken for granted 
in a post-conflict setting; logistical planning requires attention, time and knowledge of 
local conditions.  It also requires flexibility and adaptability.   
 
 
IV.  CONDITIONS FOR SUCCESSFUL ELECTORAL PROCESS 
  
Having pointed out challenges particular to elections in the post-conflict context, 
we turn to describing certain points that should form key components of the election 
planning process.   
It warrants mention that post-conflict elections should not be judged solely by the 
standards of well-established democracies.  Such an approach would ignore the 
situation on the ground and a core strategic purpose of post-conflict elections: to 
induce warring parties to stop fighting and agree to a non-violent resolution of the 
conflict.   In this regard, the bar should not be set unreasonably too high for judging 
the “success” of a post-conflict election.  A key factor to be considered is whether the 
results of the election, overall, reflect the will of the people, and whether the election 
advances the peace process and the establishment of democratic dispensation.  In the 
                                                 
29 See, e.g., AIDS-FREE WORLD, ELECTING TO RAPE: SEXUAL TERROR IN MUGABE’S 
ZIMBABWE (2009), available at http://www.aids-freeworld.org/images/stories/Zimbabwe/ 
zim%20grid%20screenversionfinal.pdf (documenting systematic and widespread rape in 
connection with the 2008 election and specifically aimed at terrorizing the political opposition; 
according to the report, all the women targeted were members of the opposition party 
Movement for Democratic Change (MDC)).   
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1994 South African elections because there were some logistical and administrative 
problems observed in parts of the country especially in Natal, the UN Observer 
Mission, the European Union (EU) Mission, The Commonwealth Observer Missions 
and the Organization of African Unity Observer Mission in the joint verdict agreed to 
use term: “the election reflected the will of the people” rather than the term “free and 
fair.” 30      
 What constitutes a “successful” election has changed over time—and certainly 
depends on the circumstances of the country.  For example, some hold the view that 
“[i]n Sudan, the logistical and political barriers to the elections even happening are so 
high that having the election happen at all, and in a way that does not jeopardize the 
fragile peace, would be an achievement.”31  There is, however, a case to be made that 
in a country like Sudan, in the midst of an ongoing conflict and genocide in Darfur, 
conditions do not exist to hold elections; any such elections cannot advance peace or 
lead to the establishment of democratic governance, and instead are likely to be used 
by the Bashir regime in an effort to legitimize itself.  The example of Sudan can be 
contrasted with Mozambique and Cambodia, “where elections are increasingly 
becoming a test of the maturity of the broader political environment and of the 
openness of elites to change, [and] a more demanding standard [for elections] is 
increasingly expected.”32  
 As discussed above, the consolidation of peace often depends on the election 
of a government freely chosen by the people and can be impacted by the voting 
system that is selected.  Regardless of whether the voting system follows the 
proportional representation or majoritarian model, there is an absolute need to ensure 
that the elections are—and are perceived to be—free and fair.  Much will turn on the 
design and implementation of an electoral process that takes into account country-
specific history and factors (e.g., potential ethnic divisions and the nature of the 
conflict), and which maximizes the transparency and security at all stages of the 
electoral process, including pre-election planning and administration, and certification 
of the results.    
Election planners should keep in mind that previous elections in a post-conflict 
country typically would have been characterized by selective voter registration, 
intimidation and gerrymandering of electoral districts.  There may be limited or no 
local experience in running an election that emphasizes the freedom of voters to make 
their choice freely and in secrecy.33   
                                                 
30 1994 UNOMSA Report, supra note 27, at 34-36. 
31 Mary An, et al., Woodrow Wilson School of Public & Int’l Affairs, Princeton Univ., 
Idealism Without Illusions: Lessons from Post-Conflict Elections, 11 (2008), available at 
http://www.cmi.no/sudan/doc/?id=932. 
32 Id. 
33 JOHN HATCHARD, MUNA NDULO & PETER SLINN, COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM 
AND GOOD GOVERNANCE IN THE COMMONWEALTH: AN EASTERN AND SOUTHERN 
AFRICAN PERSPECTIVE 115 (2004). See Report of the Secretary-General on United Nations 
Operations in Mozambique (ONUMOZ), U.N. Doc S/25518 (Apr. 2, 1993); see also REPORT 
OF THE COMMONWEALTH OBSERVER GROUP TO THE SOUTH AFRICAN ELECTIONS, THE 
END OF APARTHEID 22-29 (1994).    
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The goal in any election is thus to create a secure, level playing field for voters 
and candidates, as well as to provide voter education and civic involvement 
throughout the electoral process and translate the will of the people into a 
representative government.  At the core of its purpose, the electoral process must be 
accessible to all citizens—irrespective of where they live and their political 
affiliations—and with respect to universal registration and access to polling stations.  
Likewise, a truly democratic election is predicated on political candidates themselves 
having a level playing field for campaigning; candidates should have access to all 
communities and not be limited by de facto “no-go zones.”  The existence of an 
uneven playing field—for either voters or candidates—runs contrary to the spirit and 
reality of fair elections.   
To foster conditions conducive to such a level playing field, election planners 
should pay particular attention to establishing (i) an effective electoral framework, 
including an independent electoral administration and (ii) a comprehensive plan of 
administrative and procedural matters.  A useful resource detailing the internationally-
recognized standards has been elaborated by the International Institute for 
Democracy and Electoral Assistance.34  
  
1. EFFECTIVE FRAMEWORK AND ELECTORAL ADMINISTRATION  
 
Electoral planning cannot be limited to what happens on election day; effective 
election administration requires long-range planning, and efficient and impartial 
administrators.  If the probability of rigging is to be reduced and the integrity of the 
electoral process enhanced, considerable weight must be given to the conditions on 
the ground leading up to the elections, not simply concentrating on what transpires 
on the voting day. 
The Electoral Commission is the key body for administering elections, and 
proved central to the success of post-conflict elections in Namibia, Cambodia and 
East Timor.35  The Commission must be independent and legitimate in order to act 
effectively; if the referee of a contest is perceived to be biased, the result will not be 
readily accepted and the losing side feels cheated.  By the same token, run-off 
elections will work only if people trust in the process and supervising authority.  In 
the 2009 Afghanistan elections, the first round of the presidential elections were 
adjudged to have been riddled with corruption and badly managed; the opposition 
refused to contest the run-off elections because the Independent Electoral 
Commission was perceived as incapable of conducting a free election.36 
                                                 
34 INT’L INST. FOR DEMOCRACY AND ELECTORAL ASSISTANCE (IDEA), INTERNATIONAL 
ELECTORAL STANDARDS: GUIDELINES FOR REVIEWING THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF 
ELECTIONS (2002).  
35 See Reilly, Elections in Post-Conflict Societies, supra note 1. 
36 See Carlotta Gall & Jeff Zeleny, Out of Race, Karzai Rival Is Harsh Critic of Election, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 1, 2009, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/02/world/asia/02afghan.html?_ 
r=1&scp=5&sq=&st=nyt. 
168 Harvard International Law Journal Online / Vol. 51 
 
As guardians of the public trust in the democratic system, it is critical that the 
election administrators are impartial.  Further, the administrative apparatus should 
incorporate the local communities, engage civic participation and include substantial 
voter education. 37  
 
2. ADMINISTRATIVE AND PROCEDURAL MATTERS  
 
Insufficient attention to administrative and procedural matters will negatively 
impact the organization of a transparent and legitimate election.  The significance of 
these practical steps should not be underestimated in the post-conflict environment 
where, as noted, tension is high and public trust is low.  The following administrative 
and procedural matters should be prioritized in planning post-conflict elections:    
 
(a) Inspection of the voters roll.  The voters roll should be made 
available for public inspection to allow for public accountability 
and the participation of various stakeholders.  Additionally, 
public accountability promotes the accuracy and integrity of the 
voters roll. 
(b) Proper accounting for election materials and equipment.  In 
many post-conflict elections, distribution of election materials 
and equipment is chaotic, leading to accusations of vote-rigging.  
Shortage of materials, whether intentional or not, also can lead 
to the disenfranchisement of voters.   
(c) A transparent process for vote reconciliation.  Typically, ballot 
counting takes place at pre-determined centralized points in each 
constituency.  However, lack of reconciliation and secrecy in the 
counting of votes undermines public confidence in the elections.  
Vote counting therefore must be a transparent process. and must 
not take place before an accounting of spoiled papers, unused 
voting papers, vote registers and all election materials.  Many 
post-conflict elections see widespread accusations of ballot 
boxes mysteriously appearing or disappearing, which, 
unsurprisingly, results in allegations of vote rigging and 
contesting of the results.  
(d) A code of conduct should be implemented for the campaign 
period.  As discussed, free and fair elections hinge on the 
freedom of political parties to campaign for votes.  Access to all 
areas of the country must be guaranteed.  A code of conduct is 
important because it emphasizes the fact that political parties 
                                                 
37 For an overview of Electoral Commission involvement in voter education across select 
African countries, see the Electoral Institute for the Sustainability of Democracy in Africa 
(EISA), Comparative Data: Voter Education (updated May 2010), available at 
http://www.eisa.org.za/WEP/comeducation.htm.   
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must share in the responsibility of ensuring the freedom of 
others to campaign and canvas for votes. 
 
 
V.  INTERNATIONAL INVOLVEMENT IN POST-CONFLICT ELECTIONS 
 
International involvement has proven invaluable in navigating and overseeing the 
logistical hurdles noted above.  International support is crucial to planning and 
conducting post-conflict elections because conflict countries typically lack the 
necessary domestic resources and personnel required to conduct a free and fair 
election.  For the international community, post-conflict elections are also an 
important signal that legitimate democratic authority has been returned (or instituted) 
in a country, and that the on-the-ground presence of the international community 
may be coming to an end.  Donor nations therefore seek evidence of concrete steps 
towards the establishment of a capable state as part of their “exit strategy.”38 
To create the foundation for lasting democracy, international support should 
focus on supporting and building capacity within key institutions such as the electoral 
commission and local police forces.  International involvement is likewise important 
to plan and oversee the electoral process, and lend economic assistance and expertise 
to further the development of sound electoral laws and processes.  This is particularly 
relevant in situations of state creation such as East Timor, where there is no history or 
legacy of pre-conflict democratic governance.   
Election monitoring (including through providing international monitors and 
training local monitors) is another crucial way for the international community to 
ensure and support free and fair elections. A distinct concern relating to international 
involvement is to avoid legitimizing a flawed election.  This concern underscores the 
importance of effective monitoring throughout the entire electoral process.   
Monitoring activity should cover—geographically and chronologically—the entire 
electoral process, from the initial stages of registration through the elections 
themselves.39  To minimize the chance of a disputed outcome,40 each of the election 
stages (i.e., voter registration, campaigning, printing of election materials, storage and 
transportation of election materials, casting and counting ballots) should be certified 
as compliant with the principles of a free and fair election before proceeding to the 
next stage.  Otherwise, the international observation exercise will be superficial and its 
conclusions vague or empirically untenable.   
International observation thus requires the oversight of the actions of the 
Electoral Commission and its organs at all stages of the electoral process to verify 
compatibility under the governing legislation, the extent of freedom of assembly, 
expression and organization, voter education efforts, access to media by all political 
parties, registration of voters (to ensure, for example, that qualified voters are not 
denied identification documents that would allow them to exercise their right to vote), 
                                                 
38 See Reilly, Elections in Post-Conflict Societies, supra note 1, at 118.  
39 Ndulo, supra note 11, at 15.  
40 Id. at 16.  
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proper security measures of transport and custody of ballots, and timely 
announcement of election results.  International consultants should also help create 
transparent and speedy dispute resolution mechanisms for claims of irregularities, 
fraud and denial of access.  Elections always entail such disputes, and it is important 
that disputes are settled in a timely manner and a new democracy is equipped with an 
impartial and speedy system of electoral dispute settlement.     
The training of local monitors is likewise important—and efficient—in achieving 
“total observation” that would otherwise extend beyond the reach and capacity (and 
funding) of strictly international efforts. For example, local monitors should be 
professionally trained and work alongside international monitors, as has been done in 
South Africa41 and East Timor.42  In addition to broader geographical coverage at 
lower expense, the use of local monitors brings enormous benefits, including greater 
understanding of the local language(s) and nuances (including covert forms of 
intimidation that might elude international observers).  Further, local monitors are an 
important way of involving the citizenry with accountability and oversight of their 
own election process.      
For all these reasons, effective and committed international involvement is crucial 
to the success of post-conflict elections and to creating the foundation for a 
sustainable democratic system.  As a colloquium of African Electoral administrators 
observed: “[D]emocratic elections cannot be created by the election law itself, or even 
by the electoral authorities alone.  Democratic elections and sustainable democracy 
are built through a partnership of electoral authorities, political parties, NGOs, 
ordinary citizens, and sometimes international support.”43   
 
 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
 
Post-conflict elections are marked by great promise, commensurate with immense 
pressure to meet domestic and international expectations.  While there may be 
competing interests and timeframes in the planning of post-conflict elections, in order 
to maximize the potential for the consolidation of peace and democracy, particular 
attention should be paid to the practical challenges set forth above, and to the 
country-specific context and conditions that further shape such challenges.  In 
addition, a successful and peaceful post-conflict election requires an effective electoral 
framework and a comprehensive plan of administrative and procedural matters.  
International resources and expertise can prove critical to post-conflict elections; 
                                                 
41 1994 UNOMSA Report, supra note 27, at 42. 
42 BELUN, INT’L FOUNDATION FOR ELECTORAL SYSTEMS, ELECTION VIOLENCE 
EDUCATION AND RESOLUTION (EVER) IN TIMOR-LESTE FINAL REPORT 5 (2007). 
43 Workshop on Electoral Operations in a Democratic System, African Election 
Administrator’s Colloquium, Victoria Falls, Zimbabwe, Nov. 15-18, 1994, in AFRICA 
REGIONAL ELECTORAL ASSISTANCE FUND (AREAF), FINAL REPORT: DEMOCRACY 
DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS 150, 161 (1996), available at 
http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PDABN401.pdf.  
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however, international agents should prioritize working with local institutions, leaders 
and communities in order to benefit from relevant local expertise, while 
simultaneously building local capacity and public accountability.     
Importantly, the international community needs to remain engaged long after 
polling day and ballot counting.  Post-conflict elections must not be viewed by the 
international community simply as a “punctuation point” at the end of a conflict.  
Developing institutions of governance is complex and takes time.  Further, although 
international involvement in post-conflict elections is important, such involvement 
must be coupled with genuine efforts to jump-start not only the post-conflict political 
order, but also the post-conflict economy.    
Indeed, the major challenge that post-conflict countries will continue to face after 
election day is economic recovery.  Regardless of how successful an election may be 
run, conditions for conflict will remain ripe if the populace does not see an 
improvement in economic conditions.  In plain terms, there can be no enduring 
democracy in the midst of poverty.  Studies show that economic growth, reduction of 
unemployment and diversification of the economy are important conditions both for 
promoting democratic stability and avoiding the recurrence of conflict.44  
Long-term conflict prevention strategies should not disregard the correlation 
between armed conflict on the one hand, and poverty and the marginalization of 
minority groups on the other.45  In this sense, post-conflict elections should aim “to 
promote human rights, to protect minority rights and to institute political 
arrangements in which all groups are represented… [e]very group needs to become 
concerned that the state belongs to all people.”46  Moreover, elections should be 
coupled with concerted plans to stimulate economic growth, enfranchise marginalized 
groups and improve the overall population’s standard of living.  As Former UN 
Secretary-General Kofi Annan has remarked: “[E]very step taken towards reducing 
poverty and achieving broad-based economic growth [] is a step toward conflict 
prevention.”47   Thus, a genuine commitment to consolidating democracy in post-
conflict areas does not end with elections – it extends to thoughtful, planned 
economic investment in the country’s future and sustained economic development.   
 
 
                                                 
44 J. Joseph Hewitt, The Peace and Conflict Instability Ledger: Ranking States on Future Risks, in 
PEACE AND CONFLICT 2010 supra note 3, at 7.  
45 MILLENNIUM REPORT OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL, ‘WE THE PEOPLES’: THE ROLE OF 
THE UNITED NATIONS IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY, U.N. Doc. A/54/2000, at ¶ 202 
(2000) (remarking that in many cases of internal conflict, “poverty is coupled with sharp or 
religious cleavages,” in which minority rights are “insufficiently respected and the institutions 
of government are insufficiently inclusive”).   
46 Id. at ¶ 204. 
47 Id.   
